Gmail Outage Map
The map below depicts the most recent cities worldwide where Gmail users have reported problems and outages. If you are having an issue with Gmail, make sure to submit a report below
The heatmap above shows where the most recent user-submitted and social media reports are geographically clustered. The density of these reports is depicted by the color scale as shown below.
Gmail users affected:
Gmail is a free, advertising-supported email service developed by Google. Users can access Gmail on the web and through the mobile apps for Android and iOS, as well as through third-party programs that synchronize email content through POP or IMAP protocols.
Most Affected Locations
Outage reports and issues in the past 15 days originated from:
| Location | Reports |
|---|---|
| Paris, Île-de-France | 48 |
| Donzère, Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes | 1 |
| Bergerac, Nouvelle-Aquitaine | 2 |
| Saint-Macaire-en-Mauges, Pays de la Loire | 2 |
| Marseille, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur | 12 |
| Chartres-de-Bretagne, Brittany | 1 |
| Le Pré-Saint-Gervais, Île-de-France | 1 |
| Grasse, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur | 1 |
| Saint-Paul, Réunion | 1 |
| Mont-de-Marsan, Nouvelle-Aquitaine | 1 |
| Gorenflos, Hauts-de-France | 1 |
| Township of Evan, KS | 3 |
| Aubervilliers, Île-de-France | 1 |
| Auch, Occitanie | 1 |
| Bron, Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes | 2 |
| Arcachon, Nouvelle-Aquitaine | 1 |
| Auray, Brittany | 1 |
| Besançon, Bourgogne-Franche-Comté | 3 |
| Lavelanet, Occitanie | 1 |
| Aurillac, Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes | 1 |
| Magalas, Occitanie | 1 |
| Pont-de-Vaux, Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes | 1 |
| Saint-Jérôme, QC | 2 |
| Sarreguemines, ACAL | 2 |
| Annonay, Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes | 1 |
| Wavrin, Hauts-de-France | 1 |
| Versailles, Île-de-France | 1 |
| Hyères, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur | 3 |
| Lille, Hauts-de-France | 4 |
| Brisbane, QLD | 1 |
Community Discussion
Tips? Frustrations? Share them here. Useful comments include a description of the problem, city and postal code.
Beware of "support numbers" or "recovery" accounts that might be posted below. Make sure to report and downvote those comments. Avoid posting your personal information.
Gmail Issues Reports
Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:
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Liton Hossain (@LitonOfficial_) reportedOne thing I think a lot of email marketers misunderstand in Klaviyo... The Deliverability Score. I've seen people celebrate a 90+ score like it means everything is perfect. And panic when it drops below 70. Personally, I don't think it's that simple. The score is useful. But it's only one piece of the puzzle. A good score doesn't guarantee your emails are landing in the primary inbox. And a lower score doesn't automatically mean your deliverability is broken. If you really care about email performance, don't stop at the dashboard. Look at things like: • Engagement trends over time. • Domain and sender reputation. • Spam complaints. • Inbox placement. • What Gmail, Outlook, and Apple Mail are actually telling you. The Klaviyo Deliverability Score is a helpful indicator. Not the final answer. The more I learn about email marketing, the more I realize that deliverability isn't one metric. It's the result of dozens of small things working together.
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raeika ݁ ˖Ი𐑼⋆ (@Nzpekka1) reported@cootpancake unless it’s in the distinction of gmail just having an outage but that would certainly only be temporary
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Kingsley E. Ezemenaka (Ph.D) (@Eyuskant) reportedMore MEPs voted NO than YES. It passed anyway. 314 voted to kill EU Chat Control. 276 voted to keep it. The measure survived because rejecting it required an absolute majority of 361, not just a majority of those present. Absences counted as support. Abstentions counted as support. It was rushed through on an urgent procedure the day before summer recess when attendance is lowest and attention is elsewhere. US tech companies can now scan your private messages without a warrant or any suspicion. Gmail. Instagram DMs. Snapchat. Discord. Xbox. iCloud Mail. Facebook Messenger. This is how rights actually disappear. Not in one dramatic moment. In procedural fine print, on a slow news day, while everyone is watching Tehran. How to protect yourself. Use end-to-end encrypted apps. Signal and WhatsApp were explicitly exempted and cannot be scanned by design. Move sensitive conversations there. Abandon unencrypted platforms for private matters. Gmail, Instagram DMs, Snapchat and Discord are now legally scannable. Turn on Advanced Data Protection for iCloud. Disable iCloud backup for iMessage to keep it truly encrypted. The lesson is old but permanent. Wherever you can, own the tool instead of borrowing it. Privacy is no longer a default. It is now a decision you have to make deliberately. Follow @Eyuskant for analysis that cuts through the noise
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Attilio (@Attilio_D) reportedVoice agents just got their first real use case. ElevenLabs /agents (free alpha) reportedly connects voice to Slack, Notion, Gmail + MCP. The bottleneck was never voice quality — it was action execution. Wire it to your MCP server. What's the first workflow you'd automate?
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Yusuf Can Çakır (@Yusufcancakiir) reportedActive infostealer + crypto clipper campaign run by a Turkish-speaking operator. Live since at least 23 June 2026, still being iterated (last payload push 6 July). The entire toolkit is sitting in an open directory on a DigitalOcean node (46[.]101[.]111[.]120:8080, WsgiDAV, anonymous read-write). Version-stamped backups and installer output strings show the operator moving from an early build to v5 in under two weeks. This is a maintained, actively developed operation, not a commodity dropper. Delivery. Primary vector is a macro-enabled Word doc (Q1 Quarterly Report 2025.docm) that fires on open, XOR-decodes a URL, and pulls a batch script into %TEMP% under an obfuscated filename. That chains to a PowerShell installer. The operator is hedging delivery: a .pdf.lnk, a zipped variant, an .hta, and a .vbs loader all sit in the same directory. Install and evasion. The installer drops a Python payload plus a full bundled runtime into %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Themes\Cache\, a path chosen to blend with legitimate Windows infra. Before anything runs it carves out Defender exclusions for the drop dir, %TEMP%, and the Python binaries, then applies two in-memory patches: AMSI (AmsiScanBuffer forced to return E_INVALIDARG) and ETW (EtwEventWrite stubbed to a bare return). With ETW silenced, Sysmon, Defender ETW consumers, and any EDR relying on event tracing go blind to what follows. The payload itself is layered (Base64, then XOR against a rolling SHA-256 digest, then marshalled bytecode run in memory). Everything runs at user level, no elevation. What it steals. Chrome saved credentials and cards, decrypted via the standard DPAPI plus AES-GCM path, alongside a file inventory walked across the user profile. Exfil ships to the C2 over HTTPS as a JSON POST, with a Gmail SMTP fallback that sends the same data as an HTML attachment if the primary channel fails. Crypto clipper. Monitors the clipboard and silently swaps copied wallet addresses for the operator's before you paste, across eight coins. If you copy-pasted a crypto address on a suspect host in the last two weeks, verify it before trusting it. Persistence is the difficult part. Five layers running at once: a Run key, a Startup script, two scheduled tasks (one every five minutes, one on a 22-hour cycle), and a WMI event subscription that fires a couple of minutes after each boot. A watchdog checks every five minutes whether the process is alive and holding its outbound connection, and re-downloads and restarts it if not. The maintenance task goes further and rebuilds any missing layer from scratch. Pull three of five and reboot, and you are reinfected. Remediation means isolating the host and taking out all five together. Attribution. Indicators point consistently to a Turkish-speaking operator: the C2 control panel is served in Turkish and the SMTP exfil account follows a recognizable Turkish naming pattern. DuckDNS dynamic DNS, a single DigitalOcean node, and no infrastructure diversification profile a solo or small-team actor. No espionage indicators; this is straightforward credential, card, and crypto theft. IOCs Payload server: 46[.]101[.]111[.]120:8080 (DigitalOcean, WsgiDAV, anon read-write) C2: gogettate[.]duckdns[.]org, ports 443 and 4444 Drop path: %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Themes\Cache\ Persistence: ThemeSvcHelper (Run key), ThemeSvc.vbs (Startup), ThemeSvcCheck / ThemeSvcMaint (tasks), ThemeEvtFlt / ThemeEvtCns (WMI, root\subscription) YARA string: WinMgmt2024Init
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Muhammad Tukur | MEC (@amiirmu) reported@_MetaEarth_ Innovation is important, but so is trust. Please urgently fix the login issue affecting existing accounts registered with Gmail addresses containing a "+" (plus sign). These were valid accounts, yet many genuine users are now locked out because the same email format is being rejected. Please restore access for affected users. A strong community is built on trust.
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Patrick (@revealingimpact) reportedWarning: Google’s Broken Support System & Irresponsibly Designed Family Link Parental Feature is Enabling a New Wave of Ransomware Attacks tl;dr - Google created a feature capable of transferring near-total control of an account, failed to place meaningful guardrails, verification, or intelligent abuse detection around it, and provides virtually no effective recovery support once it is weaponized. That combination has created a prolific new form of consumer account ransomware: attackers steal an authenticated session, convert the victim’s account into a supervised child account, install themselves as the controlling parent, and then extort the victim using the threat of permanent account loss and mass identity theft. This just happened to a family member. He used the same Gmail account for nearly his entire adult life, and it became the central identity behind almost everything he did online. His email history, Google Photos, Drive files, gaming accounts, password resets, subscriptions, and years of personal information were all connected to it. He is not temporarily “locked out.” Unless Google intervenes, the account is permanently lost and now controlled by someone else. The initial compromise appears to have started with common information stealing malware, A/K/A "Stealers". Stealers extract browser data such as cookies, saved credentials, and active session tokens. A stolen session is especially dangerous because the attacker may not need to know the password or defeat two-factor authentication. They are operating through a browser session that Google already considers authenticated. The attacker then abuses Google’s own account management features. They change the victim’s date of birth, so the adult account appears to belong to a child, trigger the Family Link supervision process, and add an attacker-controlled Google account as the parent. From there, they can reset the password, terminate the victim’s sessions, and establish themselves as the trusted authority over the account. That abuse is serious on its own, but Google’s support and recovery failures are what make this vector exceptionally dangerous. In a functioning recovery system, the legitimate owner would be able to report the compromise, verify years of account ownership, reverse the fraudulent supervision change, and remove the attacker. Instead, victims are pushed into automated recovery flows that often defer to the attacker-controlled “parent” account. There is frequently no meaningful escalation path, no competent human review, and no practical way to challenge the fraudulent change. In other words, this is not merely an account takeover technique. It is a permanent account-destruction technique made possible by Google’s inability or unwillingness to support its own users. The attacker exploits the feature, but Google’s recovery model completes the attack. Without that failure, this would be a recoverable security incident rather than the permanent loss of someone’s digital identity. Google's lack of underlying controls is also difficult to defend. An account that has used the same adult birthdate for ten years should not suddenly be converted into a supervised child account without extensive verification. A new Family Link parent should not be able to immediately reset credentials and displace the established owner. Changes with this level of impact should require step-up authentication, confirmation through long-standing recovery channels, delayed activation, prominent alerts, and a rollback mechanism that the newly added parent cannot override. The consequences extend far beyond Gmail. Once the attacker controls the primary email address, they can reset passwords for other services, impersonate the victim, access private files and photos, target contacts, distribute malware, and recover accounts across the victim’s digital life. Any passwords, payment data, or notes stolen during the original infostealer infection may create additional losses. AI is making the surrounding ecosystem worse by lowering the cost of creating convincing fake applications, download pages, advertisements, support sites, and social-engineering material. Less capable criminals can now launch higher-volume campaigns against ordinary users rather than focusing only on large corporate targets. Smaller ransom demands and individual account theft can still be highly profitable when repeated at scale. The most disturbing part is that this could happen to almost anyone. Google has spent years encouraging people to use one account as their email provider, cloud archive, photo library, identity provider, and recovery mechanism for the rest of their online lives. When a company creates that level of dependence, it also assumes a responsibility to provide competent recovery when its own features are abused. Right now, Google is failing that responsibility. Until it adds stronger controls and a real human escalation process, Family Link remains an extraordinarily high-impact account-takeover vector capable of permanently separating people from their entire digital lives. Please fix this @Google @TeamYouTube
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Shanmukh (@0xRegressor) reportedhow many accounts do you have? i have : twitter : 2 discord : 2 facebook :10+ ig i dont use it anymre snapchat : 1 tiktok : 1(banned) twitch : 1 youtube : 5 spotify : 2 pinterest : 1 reddit : 1 gmail : might get in trouble if i say it instagram : 5 telegram : 1
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Contra (@Contr) reportedThis sounds silly to type, but this has ruined my entire day. I’ve spent the last 10+ hours in an endless cycle of trying to get support from disc0rd/gmail and nothing works. My Discord server (5 years of community building) can be deleted at any time and I’m helpless. I’m so ******* tired
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Abhishek Sharma (@abhi100425) reported5/ The real fix: stop relying on the web server. Route email through SMTP so every message carries proof of identity (SPF and DKIM). That's what tells Gmail and Outlook the email really came from your domain.
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Peter C. Pots (@adxflorenceco) reportedI have broken my phone screen to a degree where the device is unusable. If you call me or text me, I will not get it. If you do not know my gmail and would like to contact me, you can DM me here and I will see it at some point. I am thinking of getting a non-smartphone.
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Giulio Leone (@giulio_leone97) reported@thsottiaux @RileyRalmuto Fix usage and reset . We also need to be able to use multiple accounts for plugin like Gmail etc...
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Kazuha_Kun (@censored_panda) reportedhello! somebody hacked into my account and i couldn't access it anymore i would like some assistance to resolve this issue, this is my gmail account: ************ and this is my password: ******* before it was hacked. fast response would be very much appriciated @Google
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Michel Lieben (@MichLieben) reportedYou can turn a raw list of names into verified emails without ever logging into a single data provider. Start with the problem. You've built a list of people to reach: names, companies, maybe a LinkedIn link. What you're missing is the one thing you need to contact them, their email. Finding it is enrichment. No single provider has everyone. Each one builds its database its own way, so one covers a big slice of your list and has nothing on the rest. Bet everything on one tool and you leave half your list on the floor. So you don't. You stack providers cheapest to most expensive and run them in order. The cheap one clears most of the list for pennies. Everyone it misses falls to the next provider, then the next. The expensive aggregator only ever touches the few names nobody else could find. That's the waterfall. Each source catches what the one above it dropped, and your cost stays low because the priciest tool barely runs. Verify every email before you send. Skip it and it costs you: a dead address bounces, and enough bounces train Gmail to file you under spam. An unverified guess is worse than an empty cell. Set it up once in Claude Code, the provider order and a spend cap, then point the agent at your list. It runs the whole cascade, verifies every address, stops at your cap, and gives you one clean file. Every row comes back with the email, the source that found it, and whether it cleared verification. The few nobody could place get flagged, so you skip them and move on. Starting it was the only part that needed you.
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Aryan Mahajan (@aryanXmahajan) reportedHiring a random AI dev to "transform" your business is the single most expensive mistake a founder can make right now. Not because it costs 10K. Because it costs you 2 months believing the problem is solved while it quietly isn't. I've watched this exact ending happen to enough founders this year that I could time it. You've been sold a lie dressed up as convenience. A $100/month Cowork subscription does not run a company. It runs a HOBBY. You could hand every founder the best model in the world tomorrow and this problem doesn't move an inch. What happens at 2am when something breaks and nobody's watching it? If you're clearing $500K a year off a Gmail inbox, a shared Google Sheet, and a Notion board, fine, plug in whatever you want. You never had problems deep enough to expose the gap. If you're running $2M through six people, three vendors, and a CRM nobody actually trusts, you already know exactly how deep this goes. Even "AI project management" for ten people is not wiring Fireflies into Claude into ClickUp and calling it done. A real project manager does not hand out tasks. He knows who's on the other end of every single one. The guy who's missed three of his last four deadlines and still swears he's on track. The one who goes quiet the moment he's stuck instead of raising his hand. The one who needs the deadline said twice, and the one who never forgives you for saying it twice. An AI reading a transcript knows none of that. It's a faster to-do list. It has never met your team. It never will. You already live this. You still carry 90% of the real weight whether you've hired three people or thirty. Every hard call still lands on your desk, every time. That is not a hiring problem. That is a system that was never taught who anyone actually is. Here's the fix, stripped to what it actually is: One file. Per person. Not a personality writeup. → What they're good at → Exactly how they fail, dated, specific, tracked over months → The rule that follows directly from the failure. Not policy. Consequence. This is the Operating Brain. Not a slide in a deck. A file that gets corrected. A competitor can steal the idea over a weekend. He cannot steal the file. The file only exists after the same mistake gets caught and corrected three separate times, months apart, on a real person. That's the moat nobody is pricing in. Not the model. Not the folder. Not the prompt. What's described and what's actually running are the same thing. Your job is building the business. The Brain's job is never forgetting who's actually in it. Centralize the data first. Build the brain before you build anything else. Everyone chasing the shiny dashboard is going to find this out the expensive way.