Amazon status: access issues and outage reports

Problems in the last 24 hours

The graph below depicts the number of Amazon reports received over the last 24 hours by time of day. When the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line, an outage is determined.

Most Reported Problems

The following are the most recent problems reported by Amazon users through our website.

• Website Down (43%)
• Errors (33%)
• Sign in (24%)

Live Outage Map

The most recent Amazon outage reports came from the following cities:

City	Problem Type	Report Time
Chicago	Errors	59 minutes ago
Honeoye Falls	Sign in	3 hours ago
Helensburgh	Sign in	2 days ago
Annecy	Website Down	2 days ago
Nancy	Sign in	2 days ago
Bayeux	Sign in	2 days ago

Full Outage Map

Community Discussion

Tips? Frustrations? Share them here. Useful comments include a description of the problem, city and postal code.

Beware of "support numbers" or "recovery" accounts that might be posted below. Make sure to report and downvote those comments. Avoid posting your personal information.

Amazon Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  Max Hailperin (@MaxHailperin) reported 5 seconds ago

  @AmazonHelp Just go ahead and escalate it. Tell them to track down the agent who has that license plate and give them an appropriate message. If you care. If you want to do more than just toss your packages out into the world and hope for the best. They are your packages. Care or not.

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  TheAlphaLegion (@legioxxalpha) reported 3 minutes ago

  @Awennon Ah yes, with Femstudoes and other forced black rock and Amazon crap Primaris marines are TOTTALLY the problem as 40k gets' slopped and normified

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  STL Sports Fan (@BStock72) reported 4 minutes ago

  @TheRy_InSTL Regardless, it's a terrible look that for Dallas and Anaheim it's part of the standard Amazon offering but for us it's an add-on service.

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  two (@one2gloss) reported 5 minutes ago

  @_2skinny its not a recall its just an amazon issue

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  Max Hailperin (@MaxHailperin) reported 17 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp I have told you that one of your contractors screwed over one of your customers. Either you care about that or you don't. This really isn't my problem.

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  A. (@esqinhiding) reported 21 minutes ago

  @_kingrosier people say Away is good. and Beis. or my brand that i got my amazon that haven’t broken at all lol

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  Marcus Cruz (@Marcus8214) reported 22 minutes ago

  @rauliscoolyo @salinisalazini Problem is that there is 30 nationally televised games. So you still need ESPN, NBC and Amazon Prime.

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  Ankita (@AnkitaGhavghave) reported 23 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp Stop sending me in circles and resolve the delivery issue.

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  Brian McCormick (@bjmtweets) reported 24 minutes ago

  Take the entire market cap value of businesses that require the internet to run. Amazon, Google, Uber, AirBnB, the list goes on. Tens of trillions. Now take the entire market cap value of businesses providing that infrastructure to run the internet. Much less. Although the value of the internet is transformative to everyone, internet providers were not able to capture much of that value. Ultimately, profitability is not from the value you create, but from your pricing power and moat. Another internet provider will lay cable or provide WiFi for less profit, bringing down industry margins, until the point nobody finds it profitable enough to compete. The market is currently rewarding most every AI infrastructure layer AI business today, but being essential does not guarantee superior economics. The providers that capture the most value will be the one with the most durable scarcity, pricing power, and competitive protection.

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  Michael Rauch (@Michael_L_Rauch) reported 27 minutes ago

  @WaterGardenApps @Tesla @Waymo Terrible business with race to bottom on margins. Neither Waymo or Zoox are going anywhere with Google & Amazon money, but too many want to believe.

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  Cloudtechsuccess (@Cloudtechsgl) reported 28 minutes ago

  @pepple_miracle Boss am having issues with the Bank account I can put on my Amazon, payooner has deactivated my account yesterday

• 
  Lupen (@0xLupenn) reported 28 minutes ago

  In 1956, a secretary invented something in her kitchen. She brought it to work in a small bottle. In 1975, she sold it to Gillette for $47,500,000. It was white paint. This is Jeff Bezos's lecture on innovation at Stanford. Her name was Betty Nesmith Graham. She was an executive assistant and a terrible typist. The new typewriters used film ribbons. You couldn't erase mistakes. So she went home, mixed white paint to match the paper, and started painting over her errors with a tiny brush at her desk. She called it Liquid Paper. Then the WD-40 story. Three people. Government contract to coat Atlas missiles in storage silos so they wouldn't rust. They failed 39 times. The name WD-40 stands for Water Displacement, 40th Attempt. They named it straight out of the lab notebook. The Atlas missile market turned out to be small. So they sold it in hardware stores instead. Then Bezos talks about Amazon. Barnes & Noble launches online. They have 30,000 employees and $3,000,000,000 in revenue. Amazon has 125 people and $60,000,000. Forrester Research publishes a headline: "Amazon.toast." Bezos calls an all-hands meeting. Tells his 125 employees to be terrified every morning. Not of Barnes & Noble. Of customers. Watch the moment he explains the question nobody ever asks him. Everyone asks what will change in 10 years. Nobody asks what will NOT change. Customers will always want low prices, fast delivery, and wide selection. So you build everything around that. It compounds for decades. One week before this lecture, Amazon launched Amazon Prime. $79 a year. Unlimited two-day shipping. Nobody thought it would work. A senior product manager who worked on Prime expansion: $210,000 base salary. 200,000,000 users. It started with a $79 idea announced to a Stanford classroom. Bookmark this and watch later - after this lecture, every "stupid idea" you have will feel like a small bottle of white paint.

• 
  Uli (@88blueeyed88) reported 30 minutes ago

  @davidjohn_win @JacoKleynhans Dont think its just about some online shopping, its webservices also, your internet for example, and most likely why Amazon got the go ahead on satelite internet instead of Starlink, that will cost you more and give less. One issue with AWS leads to huge problems.

• 
  Jane Reynolds (@JaneReynolds8) reported 35 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp Thank you. I’m normally a very happy customer so it’s not a huge problem, but I will just fill out the form.

• 
  Steve Cavalier (@Drstevecavalier) reported 35 minutes ago

  HEAD IMPULSE NYSTAGMUS TEST OF SKEW (HINTS) The HINTS is used at the bedside to help differentiate a peripheral cause of vertigo, such as vestibular neuritis, from a central cause, such as cerebellar stroke. 1.Head impulse – the patient fixates on the examiner’s nose. The examiner turns the patient’s head side to side a few times, then stops. If the patient’s eyes remain fixed, the test is negative. If a “catch-up” eye movement is required, the test is positive, indicating a peripheral disorder.  2.Nystagmus refers to rhythmic, jerky, involuntary eye movements. If the patient has unidirectional (to one side) nystagmus, even with a slight torsional component, this suggests a peripheral disorder. Nystagmus that is bidirectional, vertical, or primarily torsional indicates a central problem, such as a stroke.  3.Test for skew – when the eyes are alternately covered and uncovered while the patient fixes on one point, a vertical repositioning is called skew. The presence of skew indicates a central abnormality. HINTS performed by an experienced examiner is considered highly reliable in differentiating central from peripheral causes of acute vertigo. You can read more about this and many other aspects of vertigo in the new book “Vertigo and dizziness: A No-Nonsense Approach,” now available on Amazon.

• 
  Tesla_Optimus (@Tesla_Optimus_K) reported 35 minutes ago

  Piper ******* says Amazon's AI spend still clears. Meta and Google's returns don't. Aug. 31 note: Overweight Amazon, $320 target. Amazon's ROIC averaged about 17% from 2018–2025 and they see ~14% in 2026 — ugly versus history, least ugly versus peers. Meta's ROIC is sketched down ~27 points from 2024 to 2027, Alphabet ~26. Champion's split is simple: Amazon pours into AWS, a metered business. Meta and Google are pouring into frontier models whose payback is a press release. Jassy actually walks payback periods on the call. The other two talk products and infrastructure. Amazon's ROIC can still sag if they overbuild or price-war the cloud. It's just not falling off a cliff the way the model labs are. Same capex boom. Three different receipts. Source : Yahoo Finance #Amazon #Meta #Google $AMZN $META $GOOGL

• 
  🍳 (@2kiview) reported 42 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp I tried to change my payment method to my new debit card on amazon(.)com, but unfortunately the page keep buffering and won't take me to fill the form. Idk if it's because of my connection or the server?

• 
  Captiin (@CaptnUson) reported 43 minutes ago

  @KennyEmm8101 There is also no record that Preston was offered Amazon and refused it. Bezos stepped down as CEO in 2021 and handed the job to Andy Jassy,

• 
  Flying Mitts Hockey (@flyingmitts) reported 45 minutes ago

  @tfjaybee Ya it took some digging to find the info but I did and wanted to offer it. All teams going to Amazon are to have cable deals for free viewing on cable. Idk your team but the Blues have posted over and over you dont need prime, just the game subscription. If you wanted it with prime, like it sounds like you do, that is a Amazon problem, they set their prices like all business. No need to trash the NHL for an Amazon decision.

• 
  James D Magee (@jamesdavidmagee) reported 45 minutes ago

  @Lord_Sugar Having spent a lot of the last 6 months in hospital I have to agree that YOU could help and YOU could be a great CEO of the NHS - but you would need a good team around you - I am throwing my hat in the ring! I am not sure I can be your apprentice at 64, but I will point out that the idea is somewhat flawed. Firstly, giving the potential savings to Jeff Bezos, (it certainly would not be to his employees!), would not save money, it would just reallocate it elsewhere. There are also lives at risk, so this would need to be handled with a great deal of care! The reasons? 1). Amazon charges are WAY too high and even with a Lord Sugar negotiation it would simply boost their profits and create more money for Bezos. 2) Amazon would not contribute more of these profits in tax! The Fair Tax Foundation note that a large portion of Amazon's UK retail sales revenue is funnelled through its European headquarters in Luxembourg rather than being fully declared under a single UK corporation tax figure. Amazon does not break down corporation tax for the entire UK business structure, meaning figures are estimated through specific local arms like Amazon UK Services. 3) Logistically it would not work transport wise. They have to draw down supplies much quicker for emergencies and a completely unpredictable set of unique circumstances would make this very difficult. 4) Regardless of technology advances I strongly doubt no one single centralised hub could effectively predict, procure and administer this unpredictable level of requirements - it would end up as 8-12 hubs and simply add to costs. There are MANY improvements to be made, there is no question the NHS has WAY too many Trust administrators & management being paid way too much, the facilities management is poor to piss poor. There is a list of cost saving that could be made but it certainly will NOT be solved by Peter Thiel, Alex Karp Stephen Cohen, Joe Lonsdale or Nathan Gettings - it absolutely will NOT be solved by Jeff Bezos!

• 
  Your.Favorite.Beach7 (@ldygltrspkls031) reported 46 minutes ago

  @Ilhan Is that why you shut us down, shuttered small businesses and forced us to buy from Amazon? Or what about the tariff refunds? Why did you vote to give money them instead of the taxpayers? Everything you do hurts the American people. You are a threat to us all.

• 
  Pffft2 🇺🇸🔥 (@45wonyuge) reported 46 minutes ago

  @glennsarcastic @amazon Wow, I did not know this! I think it’s because amazon uses USPS primarily now. My back up delivery person is very good but told me that my primary delivery person sends packages back when she feels they are too heavy for her to deliver. I never had this problem when they used fed ex. If you ever attempt in the future, contact me and I’ll give you an alternate address. So sorry!

• 
  Rana Pratap Singh (@ranapratap125) reported 46 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp @AmazonHelp @amazonIN Order # 407-7983205-6961960 issue NOT resolved. Your team is just passing time, no solution given. Worst support experience. Stop giving fake assurances and resolve it now. #Amazon

• 
  Alon Michael (@SpiceP0dcast) reported 47 minutes ago

  "Amazon is a machine. The machine might be broken, and this anecdote is a signal. It's a squeak in the machine - and that's not how the machine is designed to work." Listening to this clip from @ShaanVP on @myfirstmilpod, I think this idea from @JeffBezos will be even more important in the age of agents doing the work.

• 
  Raye (@rayemarkets) reported 48 minutes ago

  Every time Damodaran uploads a video, I always watch it because he usually takes a concept that sounds simple on the surface and then breaks down the incentives and economics underneath it, and this discussion on scaling versus profitability is a good example. The common startup narrative is that companies should grow as quickly as possible, capture market share, and worry about profits later, but Damodaran's argument is that this approach only works when the structure of the business actually supports it. A large addressable market and fast revenue growth can tell us how big a company might become, but they tell us very little about how valuable that company will eventually be unless growth can translate into better unit economics, operating leverage, pricing power, and returns on invested capital. A company can therefore become much larger without becoming economically stronger, and in some cases scaling simply multiplies the weaknesses that were already embedded in the original business model. This is why the distinction between scalability and business quality is so important. Software businesses can often add customers at very low marginal cost, meaning revenue can grow much faster than the underlying cost base, while businesses involving manufacturing, logistics, physical infrastructure, or expensive customer acquisition may require significant incremental spending for every additional dollar of revenue. Even within technology, being asset-light does not automatically solve the problem because customer acquisition costs, incentives, cloud infrastructure, research spending, and competition can effectively become variable costs that rise alongside growth. Scale only creates meaningful operating leverage when the incremental economics improve as the company gets larger, and if costs continue rising roughly in line with revenue, the company may eventually discover that what looked like a temporary profitability problem was actually structural. Amazon is therefore an important example, but also a dangerous template for other startups to copy. Amazon could tolerate years of weak accounting profitability because its scale was gradually building infrastructure, distribution density, customer relationships, marketplace liquidity, and purchasing power that improved the economics of the business over time, so the losses were connected to assets and competitive advantages that eventually supported much greater profitability. The mistake is assuming that every company reporting losses while growing quickly is following the same path, because some businesses are simply using investor capital to subsidize prices, acquire customers, or enter markets without creating corresponding economic advantages. Both companies can initially show the same headline numbers of rapid revenue growth and negative earnings, but one may be accumulating future operating leverage while the other is accumulating obligations that require continuous external capital. Damodaran's "Field of Dreams" can become a "Field of Nightmares" precisely when investors assume profitability will automatically appear once sufficient scale has been reached. The venture capital structure makes this problem more interesting because the incentives of the investor and the economics of the underlying company are not necessarily aligned. Venture portfolios depend heavily on a relatively small number of very large winners, which means a venture capitalist may rationally prefer a founder to pursue a much larger and riskier outcome rather than build a smaller company producing steady profits. A company that could become a profitable business worth a few hundred million dollars may be economically attractive to its founder, employees, and customers, but it might barely move the returns of a multibillion-dollar venture fund, while turning that same company into a speculative attempt at a ten-billion-dollar outcome provides much more upside to the fund. Scaling therefore becomes partly a consequence of portfolio mathematics rather than purely a consequence of what is optimal for the company itself, which helps explain why startups are frequently encouraged to expand geographically, add products, increase hiring, and raise increasingly large funding rounds even before the economics of the original business have been fully proven. Damodaran's point about pricing versus valuation extends this incentive further. Private markets frequently anchor financing rounds around comparable transactions, revenue multiples, user growth, subscribers, or projected future revenue rather than the present value of sustainable future cash flows, so scale itself becomes an input into the next financing round. Once that happens, raising capital can create a self-reinforcing cycle where capital funds growth, growth supports a higher private-market price, the higher price enables another larger funding round, and that new capital funds even more growth. During favorable capital-market conditions this cycle can continue for years, making it difficult to distinguish between a genuinely improving business and a company whose growth is partly being manufactured by increasingly abundant financing. The real test only arrives when the marginal investor becomes less willing to finance losses and the company has to demonstrate that customers, margins, and cash generation can support the business without constant capital injections. The expansion of private capital has allowed this process to continue much further than it could several decades ago. Companies historically reached public markets relatively early because public equity was one of the few ways to obtain the capital required for large-scale expansion, whereas mutual funds, sovereign wealth funds, private equity firms, crossover investors, and very large venture funds can now provide billions of dollars while companies remain private. Damodaran describes this as the creation of a gray market between traditional venture capital and public equity, and one consequence is that startups can reach enormous revenue bases and valuations before facing the level of disclosure, governance scrutiny, and profitability expectations traditionally associated with public companies. His data also show how much this has changed the profile of companies reaching the public market, with companies generally arriving larger in revenue terms but substantially less likely to be profitable than companies going public several decades ago. There is also a governance dimension that becomes increasingly important as companies scale privately. A founder managing a small startup and a founder controlling an organization worth tens or hundreds of billions of dollars are effectively running very different institutions, yet rapid private-market scaling can allow the governance structure of the first company to survive into the second. Founder control, dual-class shares, fragmented investor bases, and competition among venture investors can weaken the normal mechanisms that challenge management decisions, while large valuations can reinforce the belief that the founder's strategy has already been validated. The danger is that valuation growth can substitute for operational accountability during the scaling phase, and by the time profitability, capital allocation, organizational complexity, or governance problems become visible, the company may already employ thousands of people and control significant amounts of capital. Another part of Damodaran's argument that I find important is that staying small should not automatically be interpreted as failure. Some businesses naturally have better economics when they remain concentrated around a specific customer base, product category, geography, or brand position, because expanding beyond that niche can weaken pricing power or require disproportionately higher capital and marketing spending. Ferrari is an obvious example of a company whose economics partly depend on scarcity, but the principle applies much more widely: maximizing revenue is not necessarily the same thing as maximizing enterprise value. A business generating high returns on capital within a limited market can be economically superior to a much larger competitor producing weak returns after enormous capital investment, which means the correct objective should ultimately be value creation rather than size itself. Personally, this is where I agree strongly with Damodaran, because I do not see profitability and growth as opposite objectives in the first place. A company should absolutely sacrifice near-term profits when it has opportunities to reinvest capital at attractive returns, especially when that spending strengthens distribution, technology, network effects, customer retention, infrastructure, or another durable competitive advantage, but there needs to be a credible economic mechanism connecting today's spending with tomorrow's cash generation. I care much less about whether a rapidly growing company currently reports a profit than about what happens to the economics of the next dollar of revenue, because improving contribution margins, lower acquisition costs, stronger retention, greater pricing power, and falling capital requirements provide evidence that scale is actually making the business better. This also makes the discussion extremely relevant to the current artificial intelligence cycle. Artificial intelligence companies are being pushed to scale models, computing infrastructure, data centers, users, enterprise distribution, and revenue extraordinarily quickly, while the capital required to support that expansion is also becoming enormous. Some of that spending could eventually create exceptional businesses if inference economics improve, utilization rises, customers become deeply embedded in the products, and artificial intelligence generates enough willingness to pay to produce strong margins, but scale alone cannot prove that outcome. If computing costs and capital requirements continue rising alongside usage, then very fast revenue growth could coexist with mediocre returns on capital, particularly when companies must continuously finance new generations of chips and infrastructure simply to remain technologically competitive. For me, the most important question in artificial intelligence therefore is gradually shifting from how fast these companies can grow to how much economic value remains after paying for the infrastructure required to generate that growth, because eventually the market has to separate companies that are using capital to build durable operating leverage from companies that simply need ever larger amounts of capital to keep the scaling story alive.

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  Badgers4life48! (@badgers4ever48) reported 49 minutes ago

  @Vikeologist I don’t mind paying to watch my teams however I do have an issue when I need. Netflix YouTubeTv Peacock Amazon just to watch the NFL and I am lucky and live where I get the packers but that’s another $235 bucks for Sunday ticket if I didn’t It’s making it hard to watch on sport

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  Dawso (@jensuedaw) reported 53 minutes ago

  @SuisKirk33160 @omgsidewalks Guess you need to have a shared sense of humanity, a sense of common decency to think people matter. As a self-funded retiree, l ask nothing from 'working class folks' but when Amazon workers need food stamps, the US has a problem.

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  American Freedom (@AFPfortheUSA) reported 54 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp 12 hours? That's terrible customer service. Do better. I'm done being a customer

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  Atul srivastava (@atul370) reported 56 minutes ago

  @AmazonHelp Poor pathetic service by @amazonIN @AmazonHelp no one contacted me nor no one bothered for customer issues.

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  Fi Rhodes (@RhodesFi32898) reported 60 minutes ago

  @sunakball @Lord_Sugar Amazon does some direct supply. There are so many issues.