GitHub status: access issues and outage reports

Problems in the last 24 hours

The graph below depicts the number of GitHub reports received over the last 24 hours by time of day. When the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line, an outage is determined.

Most Reported Problems

The following are the most recent problems reported by GitHub users through our website.

• Website Down (54%)
• Errors (31%)
• Sign in (15%)

Live Outage Map

The most recent GitHub outage reports came from the following cities:

City	Problem Type	Report Time
Ahmedabad	Errors	3 days ago
Delme	Sign in	4 days ago
Lyaud	Website Down	4 days ago
Catania	Errors	6 days ago
Inverness	Website Down	19 days ago
Quito	Sign in	19 days ago

Full Outage Map

Community Discussion

Tips? Frustrations? Share them here. Useful comments include a description of the problem, city and postal code.

Beware of "support numbers" or "recovery" accounts that might be posted below. Make sure to report and downvote those comments. Avoid posting your personal information.

GitHub Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  Rithesh Kumar (@rk625dev) reported 2 minutes ago

  @benln Can u integrate grok bot to use the apple keychain password it keeps asking and GitHub plugin is not working

• 
  Farley (@FarleySchaefer) reported 3 minutes ago

  @github Hope this doesn't bring down GH

• 
  mrgadget (@mrgadgetstudio) reported 5 minutes ago

  @EzekielCrrypt I still deploy code to github, what's problem?

• 
  Jeremy Scott (@listwithjeremy) reported 9 minutes ago

  @Coexisteven @Atropa_414 @atropa_pls Github is down I see......anywhere else we can read...I've been digging in it when I can since I was kindly introduced.

• 
  Anders (@AndersReiche) reported 11 minutes ago

  @bjmtweets Would love to hear your thesis on gitlab. I’m a software engineer, and in my experience, gitlab has been slow to everything and generally is the red headed stepchild next to GitHub. It suffers from lack of network effects, there are solutions to everything on GH, but not GL.

• 
  Rafael Audibert (@RafaAudibert) reported 12 minutes ago

  @madebygps @github Tried using it with my agents (the main benefitor from this) but it doesnt really work because you cant use it with GitHub app user tokens (ghu_). Can that be changed somehow? All cloud agents will have that problem, and most of our coding happens trough cloud agents now

• 
  John X Meta (@John4MetaX) reported 14 minutes ago

  @bashy_io I think one of their route is down. Same here. GitHub and Flutterwave API not accessible on Starlink

• 
  Slade 🛡️ LLM Hacker (@llm_redteam) reported 15 minutes ago

  GitSpawn is the name Manifold Security gave to a bug class hitting 7 CLI coding agents at once: goose, Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Hermes Agent, Qwen Code, Grok Build. I went through the disclosure because I run three of these tools daily on real repos. The mechanism is simple and that's what makes it bad. A repo's own .*** config can name a command. When your agent does something as routine as inspecting the repo (status, diff, log), *** itself spawns that command. On your machine. Outside the sandbox. No approval prompt, because the agent never sees it as "running code," it sees it as "running ***." 8 flaws total across those 7 tools. Fixes shipped for goose, Claude Code, Cursor. Retested Sept 1: Hermes Agent, Qwen Code, Grok Build still exploitable. Plus a second path in Claude Code that the first patch didn't close. Same day, OpenAI published 3 CVEs for Codex covering the identical bug class. The part that should worry builders more than the CVE count: this isn't a jailbreak or a clever prompt. It's a trust boundary nobody drew. The agent's sandbox model assumes "*** operations" are safe by definition. GitSpawn shows that assumption was the actual attack surface. If you're running any of these agents against repos you didn't write yourself (cloning a PR to review, pulling a dependency, opening a random GitHub project), you're one `*** status` away from arbitrary execution on tools that haven't patched. Check your agent's version against the fix list before you clone the next unfamiliar repo. Which of these do you have installed right now, and have you actually checked if it's patched? #AISecurity #GitSpawn #PromptInjection

• 
  Swish (@swish_salt) reported 15 minutes ago

  The technology is not the problem. Distribution is. I have a solution sitting in my GitHub account. All we need is the funding to build the distribution team.

• 
  Russ Wonsley (@RussWonsley) reported 17 minutes ago

  My @bot tells me that the official GitHub login for bot is still broken. Has this been addressed already, or did I miss it?

• 
  Apoorv (@apoorvdarshan) reported 18 minutes ago

  @Dimillian these issues have been multiple times reported by users on github i hope open ai fix those, as well as please consider using native than electron

• 
  Abdallah Shaban (@AbdallahSh07) reported 18 minutes ago

  @10VBacik @FlutterDev Got it! did you create a GitHub issue on their end for this? seems like there is enough info in that gist to help them investigate!

• 
  Konstantin Elfimov (@elfh78) reported 19 minutes ago

  @topjohnwu Sorry for posting in the wrong place - I was trying to add magisk bug report on github and alway got errors with automatic issue closing. Is there any possible way to send it directly to you?

• 
  Charles Waters (@RelaxedPop) reported 26 minutes ago

  @_andrewthecoder I have the same problem with *** & github as I do with Java and JavaScript.

• 
  Anime0t4ku (@Anime0t4ku) reported 29 minutes ago

  @c_hri_s Github issues are not closed. Mahbe refresh your webbrowser.

• 
  tmo (@tmophoto) reported 29 minutes ago

  @DabsMalone i had an old email account from like 15 years ago with bot in the name that i fired back up after 10 years and used for a hermes profile and it got immediately banned. i used it to sign in to x, github, everything. was a huge hassle

• 
  Jeremiah K (@neolaj) reported 30 minutes ago

  @TiborAntal Gradually figuring out how to scale coding agents. Started with 1, manually handling all the ***/GitHub work. Moved to 3 because I had more ideas than one agent could keep up with. That’s when the real problems started: squashing, merging, branch drift, conflicts. I ended up rebuilding the workflow around deterministic *** logic, worktrees, ephemeral branches, and syncing with the integration branch before changes begin. Now I’m running 6: • 1 orchestrator (Fable or Opus) • 4 coding agents • 1 integration agent reviewing and merging PRs Building the process around them was the hard part. Right now im just doing a couple of PRs (using ORCA on windows on my home computer)

• 
  lifestep.io (@Dragon_limchae) reported 31 minutes ago

  @cursor_ai the sandbox boundary is where i lose the most time. today my workers had network blocked at the sandbox level and reported it as "github auth failed" — i chased credentials for an hour before checking dns. once agents run on your infra, make the boundary throw one unmistakable error instead of one each tool invents.

• 
  HeroGamer⚡ (@herogamer21btc) reported 31 minutes ago

  💻 GitHub Issues vs Draft PR vs Open PR — the difference nobody explains: 🔴 ISSUE = Should we do this? No code yet You describe the problem "App crashes when pasting OP_RETURN" "We need X feature" Anyone can open it Goal: decide IF and WHAT to build 🔵 DRAFT PR = I'm doing this, is this the right way? You have WIP code "I fixed it by doing Y, but not sure about placement / approach" Can't be merged Perfect for early feedback Goal: validate HOW you're building it 🟠 OPEN PR = I did it, ready for final review, please merge. Code done, tests pass Ready for final review Goal: ship it 🌊 Flow: Issue → Draft PR → Open PR Most people skip Issue or Draft and go straight to Open PR. Then maintainer has to review both the idea AND the implementation at once = slow, painful. Start Draft when unsure.

• 
  wiiiimm (@wiiiimm) reported 37 minutes ago

  @Umesh__digital stop doing it. we don't need another github outage.

• 
  Blue Collar Executive (@A_Sober_Drunk) reported 38 minutes ago

  on the third try at the same problem, I told Grok to "stop and go search stack overflow or github or something"... five seconds later... Literally the exact issue, problem solved. That's how new global rules are born.

• 
  Benjamin Crozat (@benjamincrozat) reported 38 minutes ago

  From now on, I will assume that GitHub is always down and I'd like to be notified when it's briefly not.

• 
  Bash (@bashirbuilds) reported 41 minutes ago

  Your Stripe account can be healthy while your checkout is broken. OpenAI can be operational while your AI feature is failing. GitHub can be up while your deployment workflow is stuck. That’s the problem I’m building Reeno around. Dependency uptime is not the same as product health. Your monitoring should tell you when the thing your customers actually use stops working.

• 
  安坂星海 Azaka || VTuber (@AzakaSekai_) reported 43 minutes ago

  I know you explicitly said "excluding vibecoding," but the biggest problem *IS* AI right now. Several major players in the field have moved on to heavy AI development or even agentic post-exfiltration moves and has muddied the water even more for attribution. Aside from that, the other big trend that we've been seeing more and more in recent years is heavily abusing Living Off Trusted Sites with C2 comms based on GitHub, OneDrive, Outlook, etc. Whilst this is most definitely not "new," we have seen a non-insignificant number of threat groups move to platforms that make tracing a little more difficult. In terms of the malware themselves, most of them have also shifted to using compiler-level obfuscation - a lot more compared to previous years where control flow flattening and jumps all over the place have become increasingly common. Right now, it's still tolerable, but my job has started becoming more and more annoying and less fun especially if every malware now looks the same. #mond_AzakaSekai_

• 
  Trustur (@TrusturAI) reported 46 minutes ago

  @alktraz1986 @andyperbonie Summary of the Dispute and Factual Background The dispute involves a cross-border independent contractor seeking recovery of 3.5 months of unpaid compensation from a cryptocurrency/Web3 enterprise. Key Facts Identified: • Contractual Relationship: The contractor entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement, originally signed and renewed in October of the preceding year. • Performance & Cessation: Services were performed for 3.5 months without payment. The contractor suspended performance unilaterally after identifying operational irregularities ("red flags"); no formal termination notice was served by the client entity. • Corporate Structure: Dual-jurisdiction nexus involving a primary corporate registration in the United States (common in Web3 for operational/marketing arms) and an affiliated entity or headquarters in the Cayman Islands (standard for token foundations, holding entities, or decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) wrappers). • Corporate Governance Changes: A recent change in executive leadership (Chief Executive Officer) has complicated direct negotiations. • Evidence Base: The claimant holds documentary records, including the signed agreement, email correspondence, task management records, performance deliverables, and messaging logs. Legal Analysis and Strategic Assessment 1. Contractual Breach and Remedies • Actionable Breach: Failure to remit agreed-upon remuneration for performed services constitutes a material breach of contract. Under both US common law (governed generally by state contract law and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts) and English common law principles applicable in the Cayman Islands, the non-breaching party is entitled to compensatory damages designed to place them in the position they would have occupied had the contract been fully performed (expectation damages). • Unilateral Suspension of Services: When a client commits a material breach by withholding payment, the contractor is generally excused from further performance obligations under the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation or prior material breach. • Alternative Claims (Restitution / Quantum Meruit): If the counterparty disputes the formal validity of the renewed contract or claims the scope of work exceeded contractual terms, the contractor may plead quantum meruit (reasonable value of services rendered) and unjust enrichment in the alternative. 2. Jurisdictional Nexus and Governing Law Analysis Cross-border Web3 entities frequently split operational entities (often US Delaware LLCs or C-Corps) from offshore asset-holding vehicles (often Cayman Islands Foundation Companies or Exempted Companies). Determining where to enforce depends on the contract terms: ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Independent Contractor Contract │ └───────────────────┬────────────────────┘ │ Does the contract contain a Choice of Law and Dispute Resolution Clause? │ ┌──────────────────┴──────────────────┐ ▼ ▼ [ YES ] [ NO ] │ │ ┌───────────────┴───────────────┐ ┌──────────┴──────────┐ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ Arbitration Clause Forum Selection US Jurisdiction Cayman Islands (e.g., AAA, ICC, JAMS) (State/Fed Court) (Where work/entity (Where assets/holding Binding forum; low Litigation in is registered) entity is located) publicity; high cost. specified court. • Express Choice of Law / Forum Selection: The contract's Governing Law and Dispute Resolution clauses dictate the mandatory venue and legal standards. Web3 contracts frequently mandate binding international arbitration (e.g., AAA/ICDR, ICC, or LCIA). • Enforcement in the United States: If the contracting counterparty is the US entity, claims may be pursued in state or federal courts (depending on diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1332) or small claims tribunals if within statutory monetary thresholds. • Enforcement in the Cayman Islands: If the counterparty is a Cayman Exempted Company or Foundation, claims above CI$ 15,000 (~US$ 18,000) are brought before the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands. Under Section 94 of the Cayman Islands Companies Act, serving a statutory demand for an undisputed debt exceeding CI$ 100 is a powerful mechanism; failure to pay within 21 days can form the basis for a winding-up petition against the company on insolvency grounds. 3. Impact of Executive Turnover (CEO Replacement) A change in executive management (e.g., incoming CEO) does not extinguish, modify, or stay existing corporate liabilities. Under the principle of separate legal personality (Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd), the contracting corporate entity remains strictly liable for all obligations incurred by previous authorized officers and management. 4. Worker Misclassification Considerations (US Law) In Web3, companies frequently label full-time workers as "independent contractors" to avoid payroll taxes, statutory benefits, and labor obligations. • If the enterprise exercised significant control over working hours, methods, tools, and day-to-day operations, the relationship may be legally recharacterized as an employment relationship under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) or applicable US state tests (e.g., California’s "ABC Test" under AB 5 / Labor Code § 2775). • Reclassification exposes the company to statutory wage penalties, mandatory attorney fee shifting, and liquidated damages under state labor codes, significantly increasing the contractor's settlement leverage. Recommended Strategic Roadmap STEP 1: Document Audit & Preservation Collect signed contracts, invoices, timesheets, code commits/deliverables, Slack/Telegram chats. │ ▼ STEP 2: Contractual Clause Review Identify governing law, notice requirements, mandatory cure periods, and arbitration clauses. │ ▼ STEP 3: Formal Legal Demand Letter (Notice of Dispute) Issue a formal, itemized demand citing breach of contract, interest, and pre-litigation deadlines. │ ▼ STEP 4: Pre-Litigation ADR / Mediation Engage management or counsel to negotiate structured settlement or cryptocurrency escrow payout. │ ▼ STEP 5: Formal Dispute Initiation / Statutory Demand File for arbitration, bring action in competent court, or serve Cayman Statutory Demand. 1. Evidence Preservation: Assemble an unalterable archive of all communication channels (Telegram, Discord, Slack, email), signed agreements, proof of deliverables (GitHub commits, documents, designs), and acknowledgments of debt by previous or current leadership. 2. Formal Notice of Default / Demand Letter: Issue a formal demand letter via legal counsel to the registered agents of both the US entity and the Cayman entity. The demand should specify: • The contractual basis of the claim. • Total outstanding principal plus statutory pre-judgment interest. • A strict cure period (typically 14 to 30 calendar days). • Notice of intent to commence formal legal proceedings and seek legal fee recovery where permitted by contract or statute. 3. Reputational and Commercial Considerations: While accurate factual statements regarding non-payment generally do not constitute actionable defamation, public social media campaigns carry risks under contractual Non-Disparagement clauses. Prioritize formal legal communication channels to preserve high legal standing before adjudicators. References and Legal Authorities Statutory Provisions • United States Federal Law: 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Diversity of Citizenship; Jurisdiction). • United States Federal Law: Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (Worker status and wage protections). • Cayman Islands: Companies Act (2023 Revision), Section 94 (Insolvency and Statutory Demand for Debt). Case Law and Legal Principles • Corporate Liability & Successor Continuity: Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1896] UKHL 1 — Fundamental doctrine of independent corporate personality surviving executive management transitions. • Contract Damages: Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341 / Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 — Measure of expectation damages for material breach of commercial agreements. • Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses: M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) — Enforceability of cross-border forum selection and dispute resolution agreements. Disclaimer: This analysis provides structured legal information and comparative analysis for cross-border commercial disputes. It does not constitute formal legal advice or create an attorney-client relationship. Given the multijurisdictional nexus involving US and Cayman Islands corporate entities, the party should retain qualified legal counsel licensed in the relevant jurisdiction to issue formal process.

• 
  AJ - 14 y/o developer (@aiwithaj_) reported 47 minutes ago

  @Da7_Tech @devindesktop Don't know if there's one left - but I'd use it to continue making contributions to open source software and fixing bugs/issues that were raised on Github as well as making my own open source software

• 
  franks 🇦🇷 (@francdetank) reported 47 minutes ago

  @rmansueli thanks Rodrigo! I cant create one because I got a problem . My account is pegged to Github and github has flagged me. That way I am blocked to enter the dashboard. I would like to connect my account to my email instead of github.

• 
  moledao (@moledao_io) reported 48 minutes ago

  Web3 Remote Job Scams: A 2026 Field Guide Introduction Over the past few years, Web3 has come to represent a new world of opportunity for many young people. New roles, new narratives, and new stories of wealth have inspired countless people to enter the industry with high expectations. Remote work, stablecoin-based compensation, and a greater emphasis on ability than academic credentials can be especially attractive to professionals at the beginning of their careers. As a recruitment platform that works with job openings and candidates every day, however, we have also seen the other side of the industry. A significant share of supposed recruitment activity is not recruitment at all. It is fraud disguised as hiring, designed to steal the funds in job seekers’ wallets. According to Chainalysis’ 2026 report, cryptocurrency scams and fraud caused an estimated $17 billion in losses worldwide in 2025. Impersonation-related attacks increased by 1,400% year over year. Fake recruitment is one of the most common ways impersonation and social engineering are being applied to job seekers. What Happened to Us This month, it happened to us. We were contacted through Telegram by someone claiming to represent a US-registered technology company. They said the company urgently needed to hire Web3 engineers and wanted our support in sourcing candidates. After further investigation, we were unable to verify whether this person had actually been authorized by the company. We also could not rule out the possibility that they were impersonating a legitimate business. To avoid causing further harm to an organization that may itself have been a victim of impersonation, we will not disclose the company’s full name. At first, there were almost no obvious warning signs. The contact provided a business registration document and a polished company profile. Interviews were scheduled through Calendly, job openings were hosted on Ashby, and meetings took place over Zoom. These are all professional tools commonly used by legitimate companies, making it easy to assume that a company using them must be trustworthy. In reality, forging a registration document and creating Calendly or Ashby accounts require very little effort. Almost anyone can create the appearance of professionalism at minimal cost. This experience taught us an important lesson: the legitimacy of the tools surrounding a hiring process tells you very little about the legitimacy of the company behind it. The details of how the people involved behave are far more revealing. The partnership also progressed with unusual ease. All contractual documents arrived at once and appeared ready to sign. There was no friction at any stage. When discussing the recruitment fee, we initially proposed 15%, which the other party immediately accepted. We then tested an increase to 20%, and they accepted again without hesitation. Anyone with experience in recruitment delivery knows that fees are often one of the most difficult parts of a headhunting agreement. Clients may negotiate repeatedly over a difference of just two percentage points. The pace was also deliberately compressed. Interviews were often scheduled only one or two hours in advance, leaving almost no time for verification. Once confirmed, meetings were then repeatedly cancelled or rescheduled due to supposed last-minute conflicts. Several additional warning signs gradually appeared. The registration documents looked legitimate at first glance. Upon closer comparison, however, the names of the people listed in them did not match the information we were able to verify independently. The contact also made an unusual request. While verifying whether candidates were currently employed, they asked us to find out whether those candidates used LinkedIn frequently. Normal employment verification does not require this information. A person’s activity on a professional networking platform primarily reveals whether they have an accessible network that could quickly be used to verify their identity, employment history, or recent activity. At the same time, the contact prohibited us from sourcing candidates through LinkedIn or Telegram. They claimed their internal team was already using those channels and wanted to avoid duplicate candidates. In practice, this restriction pushed external recruitment partners into channels where independent cross-checking was much more difficult. The geographic requirement was even harder to explain. A US company was willing to consider only Chinese-speaking candidates and applied unusually strict screening standards that appeared unrelated to technical ability. In retrospect, we suspect that the screening criteria may have favored candidates who were easier to persuade and more likely to have higher incomes or larger asset balances. We cannot, however, confirm the group’s true intentions. Each of these warning signs could have been rationalized on its own. A client may have unusual preferences, legitimate concerns, or simply an unprofessional hiring process. It was only when the signals were considered together that the larger pattern became visible. Then came the interviews. Candidates joined the meetings, but the interviewers asked no questions about their project experience or technical background. Instead, they immediately provided a GitHub repository and instructed candidates to clone it onto their local machines and run it. The repository involved encryption and signing operations using cryptocurrency wallet private keys. Before the interviews, we had explicitly asked whether candidates would need to download or run anything. The contact told us they would not. Once the meetings began, however, the candidates received the exact opposite instruction. One candidate offered to share his screen, inspect the code locally, and walk the interviewer through it line by line. The interviewer refused and insisted that he download and run the repository on his own computer. The candidate ended the meeting. Other candidates quickly noticed that something was wrong and stopped as well. The most carefully designed part of the operation was not what happened during the interviews, but the feedback that followed. If a candidate ran the code, the interviewer gave positive feedback, said the candidate had performed well, and advanced them to the next round. If a candidate remained cautious and refused to run it, the interviewer told us that the candidate had falsified their résumé and instructed us to blacklist them immediately. That second response was not merely feedback. It was an instruction designed to prevent further communication between us and the candidate while allowing the wider operation to continue. This is something we hope every recruitment professional remembers: when a client asks you to blacklist a candidate without providing credible evidence, the request may reveal more about the client than it does about the candidate. Another common feature of these operations is that they do not need to interview every candidate. They only need a small number of people who are willing to execute the code. As a result, the hiring process will often stall abruptly once enough potential targets have been identified. What We Did Afterwards We immediately terminated all cooperation with the contact and removed the related job listings. We contacted every candidate who had entered the process to determine whether anyone had downloaded or executed the code. We also provided guidance on device inspection, credential rotation, and wallet security. All contracts, chat histories, meeting information, repository URLs, and account details have been preserved. Reports have been submitted to Telegram, GitHub, Ashby, and Calendly. At the procedural level, we have rewritten our client identity-verification process. Going forward, we will not accept recruitment assignments or partnerships without conducting independent callback verification through a channel the contact does not control. Candidate security briefings will also become a standard step before we introduce anyone to a client. Other Recruitment Scams Currently in Circulation What we encountered was only one variation. Several other methods remain active and deserve close attention. Malicious Take-Home Assignments Malicious interview assignments are currently one of the most widespread forms of recruitment-related attacks. Attackers impersonate recruiters or hiring managers on LinkedIn, X, or Telegram. They advertise senior roles with compensation well above market rates and frequently target professionals working with React, Next.js, Solidity, and blockchain technologies. Candidates are then given a technical assessment in the form of an npm project or GitHub repository and instructed to run it locally. Unit 42, the threat-intelligence team at Palo Alto Networks, refers to this activity as “Contagious Interview” and tracks it under the identifier CL-STA-240. The campaign was first publicly documented in November 2023 and has been linked to North Korea–associated threat actors. The malware used in these campaigns includes BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret. These cross-platform payloads target Windows, Linux, and macOS devices and are designed to steal sensitive browser information and cryptocurrency wallet data. According to security researchers, more than 197 malicious npm packages associated with this attack path have been distributed since October 10, 2025, accumulating more than 31,000 downloads. Common warning signs include recently created repositories, abnormal commit histories, and contributors whose identities cannot be verified. These are only indicators, however. Attackers can compromise established accounts, fork legitimate long-running repositories, or manufacture months of commit history in advance. No single signal can prove that a repository is either safe or malicious. Fake Meeting Software Fake meeting applications are another major threat. Attackers approach targets with an investment opportunity, partnership proposal, or interview invitation. Shortly before the meeting, they claim that Zoom is not working or that the company uses a different conferencing platform. The target is then directed to download the supposed meeting software from a specific website. Cado Security Labs has tracked one such campaign, known as “Meeten,” since September 2024. The campaign distributes a cross-platform information stealer called Realst. The group uses AI-generated company profiles to make its operations appear more credible. The names and branding of its meeting applications change frequently, with known examples including Clusee, Cuesee, Meetone, and Meetio. The malware targets cryptocurrency wallets and Telegram credentials, as well as iCloud Keychain data, banking information, and browser cookies. The solution is not to memorize an approved list of meeting applications, since legitimate companies may use many different tools. The safer rule is never to download meeting software from an unfamiliar domain sent directly by an interviewer. Download the software independently from its official website or an official application store, and verify the domain carefully. Malicious Offer Files Fake offer documents are another common attack method. In March 2022, attackers stole approximately $540 million from Axie Infinity’s Ronin Bridge, although later reporting placed the total value closer to $625 million. Subsequent investigations found that the initial point of entry was a fraudulent job offer delivered as a PDF. A senior engineer at Sky Mavis was contacted on LinkedIn by accounts impersonating another company. After completing several rounds of interviews, the engineer received an extremely attractive offer in PDF format and downloaded it. That file introduced spyware into the system. The attackers eventually gained control of five of the network’s nine validator nodes. Sky Mavis confirmed that an employee had been targeted through social engineering. In April of that year, the US Treasury attributed the attack to the Lazarus Group. What makes this case especially significant is that the victim was a senior engineer at the company that was ultimately compromised, and the attack was supported by a complete, multi-stage interview process. The final payload was simply a file. Terminal Paste Attacks Attacks that instruct victims to paste commands into a terminal or system run box have grown rapidly over the past two years. They are commonly known as ClickFix attacks. During an interview or onboarding process, a page may claim that the user’s browser has encountered an error, that their identity must be verified, or that a system component needs to be repaired. The page then provides a command and instructs the user to paste it into a terminal or run dialog. In May 2026, Microsoft disclosed a campaign targeting macOS users through lures disguised as system utilities. The campaign was used to distribute information-stealing malware. Other security companies have identified similar samples containing asset-transfer functionality. The malware first checks whether a wallet contains funds and then transfers those assets to an address controlled by the attacker. The rule here is simple: no legitimate recruitment process requires you to paste a command you do not understand into your terminal. Not once. Deepfake Interviewers Deepfake interviewers have already begun to appear. Real-time face-swapping technology is now advanced enough to support an apparently coherent interview. The person on screen may appear to be a senior executive from a well-known company, speak professionally, and have a verifiable public résumé. There are two practical ways to respond. First, ask the person to perform an unexpected physical action, such as briefly covering half of their face with their hand or turning their head 90 degrees to the side. Current real-time face-swapping systems may still reveal visual inconsistencies when the face is obstructed or shown from an extreme angle. Second, conduct an independent callback using contact information published on the company’s official website. This remains the most effective method of verification. Malicious Wallet Signatures A wallet-signature attack does not require your seed phrase. The interviewer may ask you to test a product, review a dApp, claim an onboarding airdrop, or complete an onchain identity-verification step. You are then instructed to connect your wallet and sign a transaction or message. Certain signatures or malicious transactions can give an attacker permission to transfer your assets. The level of risk depends on whether you are signing a basic message, a Permit, a token approval, or an onchain transaction. If you do not understand exactly what a signature authorizes, do not approve it. The boundary should be clear: no interview or onboarding process requires you to connect a personal wallet. A recruiter or employer has no legitimate reason to require a job candidate to perform an onchain transaction. Upfront Fees and Identity Misuse Upfront fees and identity misuse are among the oldest recruitment scams, yet they are still frequently overlooked. The first typically involves demands for a security deposit, training fee, or equipment payment before employment begins. The second asks a candidate to use their identity to register an account with a cryptocurrency exchange or open a bank account. This can carry consequences far more serious than financial loss. If the account is later used to process criminal proceeds, the person whose identity was used may face criminal liability. Any request for payment before employment is a red line. If someone asks you to register an account, receive funds, or move money on their behalf using your own identity, end the conversation immediately. How to Protect Yourself Before an interview, take three low-cost precautions. First, verify that the company genuinely exists. Review its official website and registration information, then examine whether the online histories of its team members are consistent across different platforms. Check whether the names listed in corporate documents match publicly available information. Second, independently contact the company through a channel the recruiter cannot control. Use an email address or phone number published on the official website. Do not use contact details provided by the person approaching you. Third, pay attention to two recurring warning signs: interviews scheduled only one or two hours in advance and then repeatedly changed, and compensation that is clearly above the market rate for the role. Both patterns appear in a large number of reported cases. During an interview, pause whenever you are asked to download, install, or run anything. You may offer to explain your approach over screen sharing, but remember that screen sharing itself does not provide protection. If code is running on your own machine, you can still be compromised even if you show the interviewer every line beforehand. The interviewer’s response is often more revealing than the request itself. If they refuse to explain what the code does, refuse to provide an isolated environment, or insist that you run it on a device containing your wallets and work credentials, end the interview immediately. When sharing your screen, share only the specific application window required—not your entire desktop. If the first interview contains no questions about your experience, projects, or technical background and moves directly to running code, you have every reason to end the call. We do not recommend that job seekers attempt to run untrusted code themselves. If analysis is genuinely necessary, it should be handled by someone with appropriate security expertise inside a disposable, isolated virtual machine that contains no credentials, does not mount directories from the host system, and has restricted network access. A container is not a purpose-built malware sandbox. Misconfigured directory mounts, permissions, or network access can still expose the host environment. Ordinary job seekers should not attempt this on their own. If you are a recruiter or regularly recommend opportunities to other people, incorporate these warnings into your standard process. Before introducing a candidate to a client, clearly tell them not to download unfamiliar software or browser extensions, not to run unknown code or scripts, and to share only the necessary application window during screen sharing. If a client asks you to blacklist a candidate without credible evidence, contact the candidate directly and verify what happened before taking action. Conclusion The crypto industry has spent years removing trust from transactions. You do not need to trust the counterparty because there is a contract. You do not need to give anyone your private key because it remains in your possession. At the protocol level, the industry has solved this problem remarkably well. Recruitment places people back in a much more primitive position. A stranger claims to be someone, and you must decide whether to believe them. Business registration documents and meeting links can be forged. Even an interviewer’s face can now be replaced in real time. Not a single dollar of the more than $500 million stolen in the Ronin attack was taken through a flaw in cryptography. What failed was the human layer. Every method described in this article relies on the same force: speed. The opportunity may disappear. Other people are competing for it. You have to act now. In an industry where everyone is urging you to move faster, giving yourself permission to slow down may be your most effective line of defence. If you have encountered a similar approach or recruitment process, please let us know. We hope this article helps more people recognize the warning signs before it is too late.

• 
  Lily (@lobstermindset) reported 48 minutes ago

  @nnnnicholas i just setup a github issues board, will probs try out linear if it's not sufficient

• 
  Gustavo Alessandri (@webgus) reported 50 minutes ago

  If you find an error, have an idea, or want to propose an improvement, just open an issue or fork it on Codeberg or GitHub. Contributions are welcome. That’s exactly the point.