Namecheap status: hosting issues and outage reports

Problems in the last 24 hours

The graph below depicts the number of Namecheap reports received over the last 24 hours by time of day. When the number of reports exceeds the baseline, represented by the red line, an outage is determined.

Most Reported Problems

The following are the most recent problems reported by Namecheap users through our website.

• Hosting (57%)
• Domains (43%)

Live Outage Map

The most recent Namecheap outage reports came from the following cities:

City	Problem Type	Report Time
Tuxtla	Domains	12 days ago
Centerville	Hosting	12 days ago
Noida	Domains	24 days ago
Purmerend	Domains	1 month ago
Istanbul	Hosting	1 month ago
Charleston	Hosting	1 month ago

Full Outage Map

Community Discussion

Tips? Frustrations? Share them here. Useful comments include a description of the problem, city and postal code.

Beware of "support numbers" or "recovery" accounts that might be posted below. Make sure to report and downvote those comments. Avoid posting your personal information.

Namecheap Issues Reports

Latest outage, problems and issue reports in social media:

• 
  Kylobayd (@kylobtc) reported 2 minutes ago

  @John_ACW @Namecheap Good support shouldn’t feel this slow

• 
  GhostyTongue ツ (@Gh0styTongue) reported 3 minutes ago

  If @Namecheap had a **** I would be sucking it rn because how good their service is.

• 
  Baber Rizvi (@BaberRizvi) reported 4 minutes ago

  @Namecheap @NamecheapCEO It's been almost a week now since my business websites are down because my namecheap server is down and support team can't even turn on the server so my team can connect to bring my sites back up. Who will be responsible for my business losses. I hope someone from namecheap will show some courage and at least turn on the server which I am paying for. Also there is no phone number to call and speak to someone so only way to communicate is either email or chat. Such a horrible service they don't care what it means to a business which heavily rely on website and it's been down for this long.

• 
  Shubh Jain (@shubh19) reported 6 minutes ago

  real monthly infra cost of a solo SaaS in 2026: - Supabase free: ₹0 - Railway starter: ₹800 - Resend free (3K emails): ₹0 - Cloudflare free: ₹0 - UptimeRobot free: ₹0 - Sentry free (5K errors): ₹0 - PostHog free (1M events): ₹0 - Vercel hobby: ₹0 - Namecheap domain: ₹900/year - Anthropic API (light usage): ₹500–2K total: under ₹2,000/month the "I can't afford to build" excuse died in 2024. what's the real reason?

• 
  Fanboy.nz (@fanboynz) reported 10 minutes ago

  @Namecheap What did you find? based on the hundreds of domains it creates weekly on your service.

• 
  Christopher Franko (@chrisjfranko) reported 13 minutes ago

  @Namecheap Oh ****... Nice! I thought I was tripping.

• 
  WP Websites (@WebsitesWp) reported 13 minutes ago

  @TTrimoreau None. *Godaddy-pricy, had market place problems. *Hostinger+cloudflare-wouldnt use, not their niche *Namesilo-had major security incident, noone cared. *namecheap-not cheap, cluttered UI, intrusive upsells *spaceship-cheaper than internetbs, terrible UI

• 
  Great Bin Elroi (@OgaGreat) reported 16 minutes ago

  International companies understands customer care ! @Namecheap can reply even at 12 midnight ! That is a company that is customer oriented .

• 
  Jack Robert (@neutronmesh) reported 21 minutes ago

  @Namecheap @Emiliosantoss_ @omarvvvr Don't forget about the 7+ Hour (ongoing) outage with DNS changes. Thats a big seller

• 
  Clément Sauvage (@clementsauvage) reported 21 minutes ago

  .@Namecheap locks your account Support : You have to check the email we sent Me : No email, dumbass Support : Ok write to security, they'll reply in 2 hours Me : OK, doing it ... 5 hours later... nothing Current status: no access to my domain, can't swap my DNS. I rly think they don't give a **** about their customers... a huge and deep f*ck you. Have you seen a worst company ? Tell me more... @NamecheapCEO

• 
  rodrigo (@_whiletruedo) reported 22 minutes ago

  @Namecheap thx for the heads up! I'll reach out the support. but don't be alarmed bc you're my first choice to buy domain sice ever! and I'll continue to buy!

• 
  LND (@y1vl3vy) reported 26 minutes ago

  @the_smart_ape Tbh I have nothing to do with it. There are no clear alternatives for gmail. Every other email registrar could fall as well so no point into thinking that switching from google is gonna save you for sure. Namecheap can go down, microsoft as well and every other ******* email registrar.

• 
  Ramil Mastiyev (@rmastiyev) reported 26 minutes ago

  @Namecheap Almost a day 'fighting' with your tech team about port 80 blocked (VPS). Proof: fresh installs, external tests, logs — packets time out externally on :80 while :8080 works! Your team just points back at me. Can someone from your network/infra team really look at this?

• 
  🛡️Shir Khorshid Noor Cyber Unit🛡️ (@FriendOfTheInst) reported 27 minutes ago

  Sponsored search results are not a trust boundary. A fake ChatGPT download campaign used brand impersonation, malvertising, shared-link abuse, cloaking, platform-specific payloads, CAPTCHA gating, Electron packaging, JavaScript obfuscation, and staged execution to deliver malware to Windows and macOS users. This is not merely another fake download page. It is a clear demonstration of how attackers exploit trust across multiple layers: • Trusted brand • Trusted search flow • Trusted-looking ad placement • Trusted-looking domain patterns • Trusted UI/branding • Trusted installer frameworks • Trusted code-signing assumptions • Trusted AI platform sharing features What happened: Attackers promoted a fake OpenAI/ChatGPT download experience using the domain: openew[.]app The site copied OpenAI-style branding and offered download paths for: • Windows • macOS • Chrome extension The Chrome extension path linked to a legitimate ChatGPT-related extension, further increasing perceived legitimacy. The Windows and macOS download paths delivered malware. Attackers also abused legitimate ChatGPT shared conversation links, including chatgpt[.]com/s/ pages, to host fake outage or download pages. A link hosted on a trusted domain can still deliver attacker-controlled content to users. The campaign employed cloaking and conditional rendering: automated scanners and analysis tools were shown benign content, reportedly an unrelated AR/VR company site, while real browsers received the malicious ChatGPT-themed download experience. That is the key lesson: A trusted domain, HTTPS padlock, sponsored ad, or polished UI does not equal a safe download. Why this campaign matters: Victims were not browsing dark web forums or downloading cracks. They were searching for a legitimate AI tool. That is why malvertising is effective: it targets high-intent users at the exact moment they are ready to install software. The campaign turned normal user behavior into an initial access path. Windows chain: The Windows payload was distributed as: Chat_GPT.exe Reported SHA-256: 56CC26E88C064B0C423AA8AD6530E58F91D1E4D28FAB1A8BCEDEF16A6582B4D2 Additional reported Windows hash: c9e0e6985dca3a179c9bdea4e7b38f7dc57fe00ecedc2fd634256fc53bf2de2d Important: hashes are useful for triage, not sufficient for defense. Campaigns rotate samples. Hunt behaviorally. Windows technical observations: • Installer built with Inno Setup • Electron-based application • Chromium runtime components • resources\app.asar archive • Large obfuscated JavaScript payload identified as winter.js • Hex-encoded strings • Dynamically resolved functions • Control-flow obfuscation • Event-driven execution • CAPTCHA gating before core behavior • Inner Electron payload (App.exe) launched after installation • PowerShell spawned after CAPTCHA completion Observed PowerShell pattern: -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -Command - That trailing dash matters. It suggests commands may be supplied through standard input rather than appearing directly in the process command line. This reduces the value of command-line-only detection and makes process-tree and behavioral monitoring much more important. Static red flags: The filename suggested ChatGPT, but embedded metadata reportedly identified the installer as: PovariEGLESVapp Setup The executable was signed by: F.F.A.P. Hurkmans Beheer B.V. That publisher does not align with OpenAI or ChatGPT. Important reminder: a valid code signature does not mean software is safe. It only confirms that the file was signed by a certificate and has not been modified since signing. It does not establish that the software is legitimate or authorized by the brand it imitates. Additional Windows indicators: • App.exe SHA-256: D9AD44D43E57B870793FA5CF7FB3A813990D0CBD0C7087BDE70A5E61FB1F1FE6 • Unexpected Chromium/Electron profile: %APPDATA%\Satoshi • Additional reported path: %APPDATA%\LeronApplication • Reported Electron/Node capabilities: systeminformation, child_process, os, fs, zip-lib, Those modules indicate a capable execution environment: system discovery, file access, archive handling, process execution, and network communication. macOS chain: The macOS payload was delivered as: ChatGpt.dmg Reported SHA-256: 7E5B708F6659B1FAD3AAE7B589A706434FBF21708AEEC5AF5910189B96E25FEF Additional reported macOS hash: c0919e1999eaee67e67aeda0287722775afb04e9a9a0f727928b4d11265fb70b The macOS malware is reported as Odyssey Stealer, a fork of AMOS / Atomic Stealer. Reported macOS targeting includes: • Browser passwords • Browser cookies • Saved logins • macOS keychain data • Telegram sessions • Cryptocurrency wallet directories • Desktop/Documents files with sensitive wallet/key extensions • Ledger Live • Trezor Suite • Exodus • Electrum • Sparrow The most dangerous macOS behavior: Wallet replacement. The malware reportedly attempts to replace legitimate wallet-related applications with trojanized versions. That means a victim may later open what appears to be their normal wallet app, but actually launch an attacker-controlled version. That is not only credential theft. That is long-tail financial compromise. Infrastructure: Reported malicious domain: openew[.]app Reported infrastructure includes: 144[.]172[.]104[.]205 188[.]137[.]246[.]189 192[.]253[.]248[.]181 172[.]94[.]9[.]250 Infrastructure notes: • Recently registered domain • Namecheap / registrar-servers infrastructure reported • RouterHosting infrastructure reported • Passive DNS linked infrastructure to other suspicious or malicious domains • .app domains require HTTPS, so browsers show a padlock The padlock only means the connection is encrypted. It does not mean the site is legitimate. Detection opportunities for defenders: 1. Newly created executables launched from Downloads, Temp, or other user-writable paths 2. Trusted-brand filenames that do not match embedded metadata 3. Installer publisher mismatch: filename says ChatGPT, signer is unrelated 4. Electron apps spawning scripting engines: powershell.exe cmd.exe osascript bash sh zsh 5. PowerShell with: -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -Command - 6. Unexpected Chromium/Electron profile directories, such as: %APPDATA%\Satoshi %APPDATA%\LeronApplication or other anomalous Electron profile paths 7. app.asar archives containing large obfuscated JavaScript bundles 8. CAPTCHA or user-interaction gating before malicious behavior 9. Newly registered domains impersonating major software or AI vendors 10. Users installing software from ads instead of official vendor channels 11. Suspicious wallet-app replacement attempts on macOS 12. Post-install network traffic to low-cost VPS infrastructure 13. Legitimate AI sharing URLs that render fake support, outage, update, or installation pages 14. Download pages that show different content to scanners than to real browsers The key defensive point: Do not build detections only around hashes or static strings. This campaign reduces the value of static analysis through: • Obfuscation • Runtime string construction • CAPTCHA gating • Electron packaging • Conditional execution • Cloaking • Staged payload behavior • Shared-link abuse on trusted domains The better approach: • Behavioral detection • Process-tree monitoring • Parent-child process analysis • Script-engine execution monitoring • Browser/download source telemetry • Application control • Newly registered domain monitoring • Publisher and metadata validation • EDR detections for Electron-to-shell execution • Monitoring for AI-platform shared links used as delivery pages • User training focused on sponsored-result and fake-download risk For users: Only download ChatGPT from official OpenAI channels or the Microsoft Store. Do not install software from ads, mirror sites, download portals, unfamiliar domains, or fake support/outage pages. If you installed a “ChatGPT” app from an ad or unfamiliar page: Use a clean device and: • Sign out everywhere from important accounts • Change passwords, starting with primary email • Rotate API keys, SSH keys, cloud credentials, and tokens • Revoke active sessions for email, GitHub, cloud, Discord, Telegram, crypto exchanges, banking, and password managers • Move crypto funds from a clean device • Do not open Ledger/Trezor apps on a potentially infected Mac • Monitor financial accounts • Reinstall the OS • Notify IT/security immediately if it was a work device For AI vendors and platform owners: This is now part of the product security perimeter. Brand impersonation, malicious search ads, fake download pages, clone domains, and abuse of shared AI content are active distribution channels. Practical controls: • Make official download links easy to find • Monitor sponsored ads for brand abuse • Monitor newly registered lookalike domains • Detect abuse of shared-content features • Run takedowns quickly • Publish clear download guidance • Provide signed-installer verification guidance • Coordinate with search/ad platforms • Alert users when major impersonation campaigns are active Bottom line: Attackers are not just exploiting ChatGPT. They are exploiting the trust, urgency, and confusion around fast-moving AI adoption. Today it is ChatGPT. Yesterday it was another AI tool. Tomorrow it will be the next trending product. The malware can rotate. The domain can rotate. The payload can rotate. The brand can rotate. The infrastructure can rotate. The defensive mindset must rotate too: From: “Is this file known bad?” To: “Is this behavior legitimate for this software, this publisher, this user, this source, and this execution context?” That is the difference between signature-based reaction and modern detection engineering. Analysis draws on reporting from Malwarebytes Labs, Evalian SOC, Push Security, BleepingComputer, CybersecurityNews, and OpenAI documentation. #CyberSecurity #Malvertising #ThreatIntelligence

• 
  Álvaro Trigo 🐦🔥 (@IMAC2) reported 27 minutes ago

  @levelsio Yeah moving all my domains to Cloudflare too. Namecheap ui and price sucks now .

• 
  Abu Fatimah.Dev (@Hameed_360) reported 34 minutes ago

  @Namecheap has never failed me

• 
  Pratik 📈 (@PratikSinhatwt) reported 36 minutes ago

  Claude = coding. ($20/mo) Supabase = backend. (Free) Vercel = deploying. (Free) Namecheap = domain. ($12/yr) Stripe = payments. (2.9%/transaction) GitHub = version control. (Free) Resend = emails. (Free) Clerk = auth. (Free) Cloudflare = DNS. (Free) PostHog = analytics. (Free) Total monthly cost to run a startup: ~$20 There has never been a cheaper time to build.

• 
  Umesh Kumar Yadav (@Umesh__digital) reported 36 minutes ago

  GitHub — version control (free) Claude — coding ($20/mo) Namecheap — domain ($12/yr) Cloudflare — DNS (free) Vercel — deploy (free) Clerk — auth (free) Supabase — backend + database (free) Upstash — Redis (free) Pinecone — vector DB (free) Resend — emails (free) Stripe — payments (2.9% per transaction) PostHog — analytics (free) Sentry — error tracking (free) Total cost to run a startup: ~$20/month No servers. No DevOps team. No funding required. Just an idea and WiFi. There has never been a cheaper time to build. 🚀 Today is the best time to bet on yourself and build the things ⭐

• 
  Sameh Nassar (@siynrr) reported 41 minutes ago

  @Namecheap I have a problem with you and the technical support is not helping me!! My domain I want to put it up for sale but through auction but the platform doesn't even allow it even they don't provide the simplest info about the platform/partner that can be used as a broker!

• 
  Polyvalent kaizen 🀄️ (@0xKachi) reported 41 minutes ago

  Is namecheap hosting down? My websites won’t load

• 
  David O. Ehibor (@grayontop_) reported 42 minutes ago

  @AlfinCodes Namecheap altho I had a bad experience with them and it took time to get resolved. Cloudfare is a better option.

• 
  Rajiya Sultana (@HeyRajiya) reported 43 minutes ago

  @ZimalDesigner_ godaddy and namecheap mostly, never had issues with either 👍

• 
  CMJ_Pro (@CMJProus) reported 43 minutes ago

  @Namecheap is a moron service fu moron ****

• 
  Abhishek Baxi (@baxiabhishek) reported 44 minutes ago

  @Namecheap Two of my domains have been suspended due to a whois issue, and my email hasn't been responded to all day. I've lost access to my business email, and it's quite harrowing. [NC-QTU-9582]

• 
  K S (@kj_kjato) reported 45 minutes ago

  @Namecheap Furthermore, I will explode that you’ve never invested anything and immediately replied that claims are unfounded when clearly they are not. You don’t want me to expose you and your bullshit customer service.😡😡

• 
  Longevity World Cup (@LongevityWorldC) reported 45 minutes ago

  Longevity World Cup is temporarily unavailable due to a @Namecheap hosting network incident affecting hosted websites and accounts. We’re monitoring the situation and will be back online once connectivity is restored.

• 
  Matthias Reinholz (@MattReinholz) reported 54 minutes ago

  Interesting side-fact: they say the issue was about DNSSEC. However, in contrast to .com, @Namecheap doesn't let me configure DNSSEC for .de domains (not because of the current issue but generally). @grok does DENIC use a different layer/method of DNSSEC that doesn't allow configuring it on the registry level?

• 
  David Maigari (@maigari_david) reported 55 minutes ago

  @Aditya_181105 Namecheap is a good one. Great customer support, too.

• 
  Andrew Warner (@AndrewWarner) reported 56 minutes ago

  Goodbye SquareSpace. Finally! I've hated having my wife's site on Squarespace. Some consultant set her up with it and I never had the patience to move it. On Sunday I told Claude Code to copy her site to a free @Cloudflare acount. Then I told Claude's Chrome plugin to figure out how to tell NameCheap where to point the domain. So satisfying.

• 
  Mehmet Ali Demirci (@malidemirci_gm) reported 58 minutes ago

  @Namecheap unable to solve CDN and slow site problems for over two days!